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A PROPOSAL FOR MAKING PRODUCT LIABILITY
FAIR, EFFICIENT AND PREDICTABLE
Christopher J. Dodd*
Today, the headlines have disappeared. Time magazine no longer
trumpets, "Sorry America, Your Insurance Has Been Canceled."' The
huge availability problems of 1986 seem largely to have disappeared, to
be replaced by insurance policies with higher deductibles, lower total
coverage and inclusion of attorneys' fees within the policy limits-often
for several times the price in 1981.
Of course, not everyone can afford the new coverage. Across the
country, businesses are thinking long and hard about whether they can
afford the insurance to introduce new products. Some public parks have
closed, and small community swimming pools are trying to decide whether
they can afford the increased cost of liability insurance. In short, the
liability crisis of 1986 has disappeared and has been replaced by much
quieter scenes of desperation.
Just as the liability crisis has quieted in the country, so has it quieted
in Congress. After the excitement of the 99th Congress, when the full
Senate considered a radically different solution 2-based upon creating
incentives for the parties to settle claims 3-Congress once again is confronted with proposals to tinker with the rules of the tort system. 4 The
main bill under consideration in the House of Representatives, H.R. 1115,
calls for a return to fault-based standards, for narrowing joint and several
liability, and for making it more difficult to recover punitive damages. 5
*

I.
2.
3.

4.

5.

Member, United States Senate. B.A., Providence College, 1966; J.D., University of Louisville,
1972.
Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, Time, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16.
S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
S. 2760 was reported from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on
Aug. 14, 1986. (132 CONG. RIc.'Sl1742 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986)). The bill was considered on
the Senate Floor on Sept. 17, 22, 23 and 25, 1986. See generally S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986). After several favorable procedural votes, the bill was withdrawn because it was
clear there was inadequate time left in the session to reach a final vote, given the threat of a
filibuster. 132 CONG. REc. S13709-12 (1986).
The major product liability bills before consideration of S. 2760 and its predecessors in the 99th
Congress (Senate Amendment No. 16 to S. 100, Senate Amendment No. 100 to S. 1999), were
tort reform bills. The major bills seriously considered by congressional committees were H.R.
7000 in the 96th Congress, S. 2631 in the 97th Congress, S. 44 in the 98th Congress, and S.
100 earlier in the 99th Congress. See H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S 6878
(daily ed. June 16, 1986); S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S6846 (daily ed. June
16, 1982); S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S71 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983); S. 100,
99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S71 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985); H.R. 1115, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H708 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1987).
The bill also contains provisions dealing with workers' compensation offset and provides defenses
for drunken driving defendants and manufacturers in compliance with government standards.
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Although bills providing alternatives to litigation for resolving product
liability claims have been introduced in the Senate, 6 no Senate committee
has plans for considering them.
For the time being, it appears as though the only product liability
legislation Congress is likely to consider in the 100th Congress is "tort
reform" legislation. Unfortunately, any such legislation, even if enacted,
would not solve the problems with product liability law. Before outlining
the kind of legislation that would benefit all parties, this article will discuss
how the country got into its present problems and how the Senate has
tried to address those problems.
THE TORT SYSTEM: ROUND TRIP FROM STRICT LIABILITY TO
FAULT LIABILITY BACK TO STRICT LIABILITY
During the past 150 years, the tort system has come almost full circle
in its treatment of injured persons. In the horse-and-buggy days that
preceded the Industrial Revolution, when accidents were relatively few
and most injuries were minor, an accident victim was able to recover
compensation from the person who caused the injury without having to
prove that the responsible person was at fault. In short, the law was strict
liability.
In the 19th century, with the advent of the Industrial Revolution,
strict liability gave way to fault liability. The change reflected the concern

6.

The less ambitious nature of the bill compared with its predecessor tort reform proposals reflects
largely strategic considerations-getting the bill referred solely to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, rather than jointly referred to the Commerce Committee and the Judiciary
Committee.
S. 688, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S2860 (1987), introduced by Sen. Danforth,
contains the settlement provisions of S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. S11742
(1986). Unlike S. 2760, it was referred to the Judiciary Committee, although the committee has
yet to conduct hearings. S. 666, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S2823 (1987),
introduced by Sen. Kasten and others, contains a settlement system based on Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Briefly, it permits the parties to make offers to settle claims
and, if there is no agreement, to bet on the outcome in the trial. There need be no basis
whatsoever for any particular offer, but if it is turned down and the court awards more than
the offer, the prevailing party gets a bonus. If it awards less, the party is penalized. It is difficult
to see how such a system is likely to produce similar awards for similarly injured people.
The Federal Rules provide:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against
him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then
accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written
notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of
acceptance together with proof of service thereof, and thereupon the clerk shall enter
judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn, and evidence thereof is
not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally
obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the
costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another
has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the
liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may
make an offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before
trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencenent of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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that a strict liability system would be so expensive it would inhibit the
development of socially useful but more dangerous products. Proponents
of the fault system argued that it would encourage safety because manufacturers would try harder to avoid causing injuries, and potential victims
would be more careful because they knew they could not recover if their
behavior in any way contributed to the injury.
The original fault-based tort system was harsh for injured people.
With its rigid requirements for identification, proof of fault and proof
of the absence of contributing fault on the part of the plaintiff, relatively
few plaintiffs were able to recover. A twenty-six volume 1971 Department
of Transportation study of the liability system for auto accident cases
found that fifty-two percent of seriously or fatally injured persons received
7
nothing from the tort system.
Just as the introduction of the tort system was based on the circumstances and mores of that time, so, too, are the recent changes in the
law, court decisions and jury verdicts that have brought the tort system
closer and closer to a strict liability system. In large part, the changes
flow from the fact that people whose products or activities have a tendency
to injure others-from manufacturers to doctors to drivers of automobiles-could ill afford to bear the full extent of the losses themselves and
so have purchased insurance to spread the risk. Plaintiffs' lawyers are
aware that most people have insurance and, therefore, sue more often.
Judges and juries are similarly aware of the insurance and have found
ways to restrict the harsh requirements of the tort system in order to
compensate more plaintiffs.8
Unquestionably, the success of the trial bar in easing the burdens on
plaintiffs has improved the situation for victims. Plaintiffs' lawyers have
successfully championed the movement from contributory negligence 9 to
various forms of comparative negligence, 0 abolition of host/guest statutes,
7.

8.

9.

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR
COPENSATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 36 (1971). The summary volume of the study, which assessed the fault system

of the late 1960s for auto accident cases, also concluded it "ill serves the accident victim, the
insuring public and society; i]t is inefficient, overly costly, incomplete and slow; [and] [i]t
allocates benefits poorly, discourages rehabilitation and overburdens the courts and the legal
system." Id. at 100.
Insurance has also played a role in improving the plaintiff's position. The advent of widespread
health insurance and greater disability insurance has enabled plaintiffs to be able to wait longer
to settle cases, thereby increasing their leverage to get larger settlements. Although this result is
good for victims, obviously it increases costs for defendants. This is not necessarily a bad result,
but it raises the larger question of whether there are more efficient ways to assure that deserving
victims receive more adequate and appropriate compensation.
Contributory negligence is a defense to a negligence action. It is defined as conduct on the part
of the plaintiff which is below the standard to which he is legally required to conform for his
own protection and which is a contributing cause which cooperates with the negligence of the
defendant in causing the plaintiff's harm. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS

10.

451-52 (5th ed. 1984).

There are basically three types of comparative negligence systems: pure, modified and slightgross.
Under a system of pure comparative negligence, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not
operate to bar his recovery altogether, but it does serve to reduce the amount of damages owed
by defendants in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. Id. 47172.
Under a system of modified comparative negligence, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does
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adoption of strict liability doctrines, broadening of joint and several
liability, adoption of enterprise liability and market share liability, and
compensation for "fear of injury." These changes" have made the tort
system fairer for victims, but at considerable cost to manufacturers and
with an unpredictability of future responsibilities that makes insurers wary
of insuring businesses or, at a minimum, results in far higher premiums.
In many jurisdictions, the manufacturers' complaint that the tort
system has been turned into a compensation system, with tort damages,
appears to be justified. Nevertheless, the tort system remains a bad deal
for injured people. A significant number of innocent victims still go
uncompensated, there are long delays before recovery, people with similar
injuries incurred in similar ways receive radically different recoveries, and
the transaction costs for delivering the benefits that the system does deliver
are very high.
If the tort system ill serves manufacturers and victims, would reform
help either or both? Probably not. Consider the manufacturers' objectives-to eliminate recoveries where the manufacturer has not been negligent, to reduce awards where it has been, and to reduce transaction
costs, by enacting uniform rules for product liability cases. It probably
would be impossible to reduce the number of awards in bizarre accident
cases because judges and juries can and do stretch factual situations to
fit legal rules when they are sympathetic to the plight of the injured party.
There is no reason to believe that the provisions of any tort reform bill
would change those responses and the opportunities the tort system
provides for granting recoveries.'

2

Moreover, tort reform legislation probably would not reduce transaction costs because they are the result of having to use the legal system
to settle cases, not because lawyers spend much time researching the law.
To the contrary, most trial attorneys spend the bulk of their time preparing
the factual side of their cases. That would not change if Congress enacted
legislation requiring use of a fault standard.
DEFICIENCIES OF THE TORT SYSTEM FOR VICTIMS
Obviously, the objectives of the proponents of tort reform legislation
have not been able to make it easier for victims'to recover. The corollary
of that proposition is not, however, that injured people should be satisfied

11.

12.

not bar recovery so long as it remains below a specified proportion of the total fault-for
example 50%. Id. at 473-74.
Only two states (Nebraska and South Dakota) currently use a slight-gross system of comparative
negligence. Under this system, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a bar to recovery unless
his negligence is "slight" and the defendant's negligence by comparison is "gross." If a plaintiff
meets this threshold criterion, he or she is allowed to collect damages, but the amount will be
reduced by the proportion of the total negligence that is attributable to the plaintiff. Id. at 474.
For further discussion of these principles, see, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,
90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th
Cir. 1974); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981); Phillips v.
Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in
Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 586-87 (1980).
For a discussion about why tort reform proposals would not reduce the size of awards, see
infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
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with the present system. They stand to benefit as much or more than
manufacturers from legislation to create alternatives to the tort system.
The deficiencies of the tort system in product liability cases are
numerous. The system fails to pay a significant number of people all
would consider worthy of compensation; it grossly overpays people with
small losses and sadly underpays those with the most serious losses; it
takes too long to pay the people it does pay; it is highly inefficient, often
paying more to lawyers and insurance companies than to victims.
1.

The Possibility of Nonrecovery

A survey of 24,452 claims by the Insurance Services Office in 1977
showed that one-third of all claims were closed with no payment.13
Although it is impossible to tell from the data how many of these people
were "innocent" victims, it is clear that many would fit into the following
categories of innocent injured persons:
(1) people who cannot identify the maker of the product (this situation
usually occurs where there is a long latency period before the injury or
where the product is generic);
(2) people who are injured by a product when the manufacturer was
not negligent, in states that do not apply a strict liability standard, and
even in many strict liability jurisdictions when they employ a risk-utility
analysis of the product;
(3) people injured by "unavoidably unsafe" products, a defense
based upon the utility of the product to society as a whole, regardless of
its effect on particular individuals (as in the DPT vaccine cases);
(4) people whose negligence made a minimal contribution to the
injury, in states that maintain the defense of contributory negligence.
2.

Disparity Between Losses and Recovery

Those who prevail find the amount of recovery as a percentage of
economic losses goes down as those losses rise. For example, the people
in the Insurance Services Office study with the greatest economic loss
recovery were those with economic losses from $1 to $1,000, who recovered
an average of 482% of economic loss (the amount above 100% being for
noneconomic damages). 14 Technically, the highest recovery belongs to the
13.

INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
OF SURVEY RESULTS 1977, at 11 [hereinafter cited as CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY].

14.

The distribution of plaintiff's economic loss, as adjusted to reflect net compensation, reads as
follows:
Percentage recovery
Economic loss range
482
$1 to
$1,000
372
$1,001 to
$2,000
239
$3,000
$2,001 to
225
$4,000
$3,001 to
318
$5,000
$4,001 to
220
$7,500
$5,001 to
186
$7,501 to $10,000
171
$10,001 to $15,000
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second-largest category of prevailing victims, those with no economic
losses. Because this group's recovery exceeded $0-the average was $804
a person-the percentage recovery was infinity.
Part of the reason for such high recoveries at such low levels of loss
lies in the nuisance value of a claim, where it is cheaper for a company
to pay a small amount in a questionable case than it is to fight the claim.
Nevertheless, the survey found that losses up to $100,000 were compensated on the average at more than 100% of economic loss."
After $100,000 of losses, the picture changes dramatically. People
with losses of more than $100,000-those most demonstrably in need of
compensation and most of those with the worst pain and suffering-were
two percent of the victims, but they incurred seventy-eight percent of the
losses. On the other hand, they received only thirty-two percent of the
payments. The disparity between losses and recoveries was most dramatic
for plaintiffs whose losses exceeded $1 million. Their net recovery, after
16
subtracting attorneys' fees, was only six percent.
Although no other closed-claims surveys on product liability have
been conducted since 1977, and the climate for such lawsuits has changed
during the last decade, additional data support the fact that people with
relatively small economic losses are overpaid, and those with the most
serious losses are underpaid. One recent study examined the files of 500
plaintiffs whose combined economic loss and attorneys' fees totalled more
than $140 million. 7 The study shows that, after attorneys' fees are
subtracted from gross recoveries, this group recovered, on average, ninetyone percent of past and projected future economic losses." As in the

15.
16.
17.
18.

$15,001 to $20,000
161
$20,001 to $25,000
156
$25,001 to $50,000
134
$50,001 to $100,000
176
$100,001 to $200,000
43
$200,001 to $300,000
55
$300,001 to $400,000
39
$400,001 to $500,000
20
$500,001 to $750,000
11
$750,001 to $1 million
72
$1 million and up
6
See CLOSED CLAIMS SuRVEy, supra note 13, at 383 (Chart titled Distribution of Economic LossBI (untrended)).
The inconsistency of the $750,000 to $1 million figure derives from the fact that there were
only two recoveries in that category. It is worth noting that the figures in this chart reflect only
the average recovery of people who recovered something. Obviously, the average compensation
for injured people would be lower if the survey included all victims, including those who
recovered nothing. See id.
The final percentages were reached by dividing total payments by the number of injured
parties and comparing it to the total economic loss divided by the number of injured parties.
All gross recovery figures, except for those in the $1 to $1,000 range, were reduced by onethird to arrive at a net compensation figure. See id.
See id.
See id.
See ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS & AMERICAN INSURANCE ASS'N, A STUDY OF LARGE
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1985 at 18-19.
Id. at 18-19 (the author has subtracted one-third from the gross recoveries as a conservative
estimate of attorneys' fees and other legal costs).
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earlier study, the more serious cases had the lowest percentage recoveries.
Specifically, people with economic losses of more than $100,000 but less
than $200,000 recovered an average of 1510%0 of their losses, 9 and people
with losses of more than $200,000 but less than $500,000 recovered ninetyfive percent.20 In sharp contrast, those with losses of more than $500,000
but less than $1 million recovered sixty-seven percent of their losses, 2' and
those with losses of $1 million or more recovered a net of only thirtynine percent. 22 Interestingly, despite the concern about more product
liability cases and higher verdicts, these figures parallel data compiled by
the Alliance of American Insurers in 1975 and 1979. Thus, it is not
unreasonable to assume that another closed-claims study of product liability claims would produce data similar to the 1977 Insurance Services
Office data.
3.

Disparity of Recovery in Similar Cases

Despite the compelling nature of the closed-claim figures, they disguise
another problem-a tremendous disparity of recoveries among claimants
with similar losses. Although the Insurance Services Office charts do not
reveal the circumstances surrounding each case, the facts indicate that
about half the people with economic losses of more than $10,000 recovered
less than their economic losses, and the other half recovered more than
their losses. The substantial under- and over-recoveries support the thesis
that similarly situated people are receiving dramatically different treatment
23
under the tort system.

Almost as disturbing is the fact that it often takes five years to pay
the claim for the average dollar amount involved. 24 Because people often
have inadequate resources to pay for their medical and rehabilitation costs
and their work losses, such delays in payment are unconscionable. Moreover, studies have shown that when rehabilitation has to be delayed, the
degree of recovery achieved is less than when the problem can be treated
25
immediately.
Other studies reveal that people with lower incomes and lower educational levels recover far less than their middle-class counterparts because
they have less access to attorneys, cannot afford to wait as long to recover
26
and often are not good witnesses.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See CLOSED CLAIMS SuRvEy, supra note 13, at 383.
See id. at 79.
FederalStandards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hearings on H.R. 6601,
H.R. 7476, H.R. 1597, H.R. 2300, H.R. 2508, H.R. 5149 before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection and Finance and House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 594 (1977) (statement of Leonard .Bender, M.D., on behalf of the American Congress
of Rehabilitation Medicine and the American Academy of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation).
See, e.g.,
1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., EcoNoMc CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIEs
52-53 (1970).
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Excessive Legal Fees

The fourth disturbing fact that Insurance Services Office data revealed
is that the tort system is highly inefficient, paying attorneys for both sides
slightly less than the net compensation provided to victims, before taking
into account the overhead costs of insurers. 27 Similarly, a recent study
found that net compensation to victims through the tort system totalled
between $13 billion and $16 billion in 1985, while transaction costsincluding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, defense legal fees, public expenditures
and the time of litigants-were between $15 billion and $19 billion.2 8 The

fact that attorneys make so much money from the system is not a criticism
of attorneys; it is the logical result of a system that requires attorneys for
resolution.
For all these reasons, the tort system provides inadequate compensation to injured persons. Moreover, because of its uncertainty and
unpredictability, it is also questionable whether it deters the production
of unsafe products. 29 Unfortunately, except for the 99th Congress, debaters
have focused on changing the tort system to produce better results for
their interests. They miss the major point-the legal system itself is the
problem.
THE 99TH CONGRESS: EFFORTS TO CREATE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE TORT SYSTEM
In order to provide a starting point for the creation of a speedy and
equitable alternative to the tort system for product liability cases, on
March 19, 1985, the author introduced Senate Amendment No. 16 to S.
100, the Product Manufacturers' Responsibility Act of 1985. It was not
designed to change the objectives of the tort system-compensation,
punishment and the creation of incentives to produce safer products.
Instead, the Amendment was designed to achieve those same objectives
more fairly and efficiently.30
27.
28.
29.

See CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY, supra note 13, at 90-91 (as defense costs to plaintiff's fees).
J. KAK.Axi AND N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITGATION IX (1986).
It is difficult for companies to know what level of safety must be built into products to avoid
liability suits when the same conduct can produce different results in different jurisdictions.
Further, lawsuits for the same injuries from the same conduct involving the same product can
produce radically different results, depending upon the lawyers, the judge and the jury in any
given case. Although the tort system's very unpredictability may create some incentives for
safety, it is difficult to tell just what message such uncertainty sends to manufacturers. A study
of 10 companies that tried to monitor product liability developments and factor the result into
their products found that even in such sensitized companies, the information about verdicts was
not well transmitted to the people who designed the products. Moreover, even when the designers
fully understood the results of court cases, there was often little or nothing they could learn
from them to apply to their own designs. See P. REUTER AND G. EADs, DESIGNING SAFER
PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABLITY LAW AND REGULATION

30.

(1985).

Product Liability Act Amendments, 1985: Hearing on S. 100 Before the Subcomm. on the
Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Hearing] (statement of Sen. Dodd). The Amendment had
four basic purposes:
1. to provide a faster system of assured but limited compensation of the economic losses of
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141

Operation of a Tort System Alternative
The Amendment sought to give injured persons a choice between
seeking recovery for their economic losses in a speedy claims system with
a lower standard of proof for recovery and seeking full tort damageseconomic, noneconomic and, where appropriate, punitive-in a tort system
in which they would have to prove that the manufacturer was negligent
in producing the product.
The proposed system could be viewed, in the words of Yale Law
School Dean Guido Calabresi, as a "dog with two tails." 3 The claims
system would be the source of recovery for most people-although there
would be two residual lawsuit systems. One tail would be a traditional
tort system for those who did not wish to pursue compensation through
the claims system. The second tail would be a legal system to enforce
payment under the claims system where the manufacturer refused to pay
on a bona fide claim.
The claims system would be similar to the present strict liability
system, except that it would be carried out without attorneys, and recovery
would be limited to economic damages." It would not consider the conduct
of the manufacturer. An injured person could recover economic damagesmedical and rehabilitation expenses, as well as work loss, replacement
services loss and loss due to death-directly from the manufacturer within
seventy-five days if the person were injured by an unsafe product, 33 one
that caused the claimant's harm while being used in a manner and for a
purpose that was anticipated by the manufacturer or that occurs so
commonly among product users that the manufacturer may be assumed
to have anticipated such use.
The Amendment would have denied injured persons recovery in four
situations, all of which were designed to cover cases where the injured
person was in the best position to avoid injury. Thus, a person would
not have recovered where:
* recognizable and obvious dangers caused the injury, such as those
caused by sharp knives, alcohol or tobacco;
* the claimant's alteration or modification of the product caused the
injury;
* the injury resulted from claimant's assumption of the risk; and 3 4
* the injury resulted from the gross negligence of the injured person.

31.
32.
33.
34.

innocent people injured by unsafe products;
2. to encourage the production of useful new products by responsible manufacturers by
placing limitations on damages in the claims system;
3. to retain the tort system to punish negligent manufacturers and to help deter carelessness
by other manufacturers; and
4. to reduce the overhead costs associated with the present lawsuit system so that more of
the system's dollars could be used to compensate victims and perhaps even reduce the costs of
consumer goods.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
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This standard was designed to afford recovery to "innocent" persons
injured by products, regardless of the degree of care taken by the
manufacturer. Thus, as between two innocent parties-the injured person
and the manufacturer-the manufacturer should bear the loss. There are
two reasons for this policy-the manufacturer is in the better position to
35
avoid the loss and the manufacturer is better able to absorb the loss.
The injured person going into the claims system would forego his or her
chance to hit the jackpot in the tort lottery system for the greater certainty
of being made economically whole more quickly in the claims system.
Speedy recovery is crucial to injured persons, particularly the severely
injured. By guaranteeing payment to innocent persons through the claims
system within seventy-five days, the Amendment would have enabled
people to have the economic wherewithal to get on with their lives.
Disputes Under the Claims System
The next issue that a claims system must handle is what to do when
there are disputes about the cause or amount of an injury. The Amendment's system would have levied sufficient penalties on the manufacturer
who failed to pay to encourage payment in legitimate cases and probably
even in some questionable cases.3 6 The penalties, however, would be low
enough to encourage a manufacturer to dispute a claim when it legitimately
disputes responsibility.
Under the system, a manufacturer would have three choices after
receiving a claim. First, it could pay the claim, which means paying the
injured person for net economic loss. 3 7 Second, a manufacturer could
admit responsibility for the injury but dispute the appropriateness of the
expenses. In that case, the matter would be given to an arbitrator to
decide. 8 Third, a manufacturer might dispute responsibility for the injury
In that case, the injured person could sue the manufacturer, either through
a traditional tort lawsuit or under the claims system. a9
Under the claims system, an injured person who satisfies the standards
discussed previously would be entitled to net economic loss, a two percent
per month interest penalty (to discourage manufacturers from delaying
payment in order to earn interest) and a reasonable attorney's fee. The
manufacturer also would have to pay its own attorneys' fees.4 This is
the system now successfully used in no-fault automobile insurance states.
In sum, under the claims system individuals would have secured
several advantages over today's tort system, including greater certainty of
recovery for "innocent" victims, speedy and timely recovery, and recovery

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Net economic loss is the amount of loss less entitlements from other sources for the same injury,
such as private health insurance and worker's compensation. See id. at 8-9.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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according to their losses, even where those losses exceed $1 million. 4 '
Retention of the Tort Remedy Option
Under the Amendment, an injured person still could choose to sue
in the tort system, either initially or before a claim is paid. Once a person
42
filed a tort lawsuit, however, the person could not use the claims system.
The Amendment's tort system was limited. The most significant features
would have prohibited the application of strict liability in design defect
and failure-to-warn cases 43 and applied a fair statute of limitations for
injuries that have long latency periods."
With a separate claims system to assure compensation, the residual
tort system should focus more on punishment and deterrence. 4 That
means that it should be difficult to get into the tort system, and those
who are there should believe that the manufacturers' conduct was truly
negligent or worse. At the same time, it should be easier for the injured
person to make the case in that system, which might necessitate some
changes in rules of discovery and record keeping. 6
This approach would present incentives for safety. Of course, the
Amendment would have retained the tort system for those who wished to
sue negligent manufacturers. But the tort system has limitations as a
deterrent system today because of its very unpredictability. The greater
certainty of recovery in the claims system also would provide strong
incentives for safety. Any manufacturer that has to pay many claims,
even for smaller amounts, would be at a distinct competitive disadvantage
relative to its safer competitors. Thus, the greater certainty of payment
under the claims system, coupled with the unpredictability of the tort
system, would provide stronger incentives for safety than exist today.
In sum, Senate Amendment No. 16 was designed to provide faster,
more certain and more equitable compensation for injured persons, greater
incentives for product safety, and greater predictability and lower system
costs for manufacturers than either the present tort system or any of the
proposals to reform it.
EVOLUTION OF THE CLAIMS SYSTEM
After Senate Amendment No. 16 was introduced, Congress spent
eight months debating the virtues and vices of the system, plus those of
a similar system in Senate Amendment No. 100, introduced by Sen.
41.

The Amendment was not particularly suited for injuries where causation was difficult to prove,
for example, illnesses with long latency periods or injuries caused by pharmaceuticals. The
problem with the latter group is that almost all drugs are necessarily accompanied by side
effects. To the extent that such side effects are clearly warned against, and those warnings are
understood by the injured person, it may not make sense to hold the manufacturer liable. See
id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10.
46. See id.
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Gorton. 47 Particular focus was on the standard for compensation under
the claims system. 4 The result of this debate was S. 1999, 4 9 introduced
by Sen. Danforth in November 1985, and co-sponsored by Sen. Kassebaum
and me. S. 1999 retained the concept of giving the consumer a choice
between a speedy claims system for economic loss and a fault-based tort
system for full tort damages, but it also made several major changes. It
revised the "trigger" or standard for entry into the claims system50 and
added provisions dealing with compensation for injuries in situations
involving long latency periods, 5 the payment of attorneys' fees as part of
economic loss, 5 2 manufacturers' record keeping of problems associated
with their products," tighter restrictions on the recovery of punitive
damages, 5 4 and several additional changes in the residual tort system.
S. 1999 failed largely because of differences over the standard for
compensation in the claims system. The business community feared the
standard might greatly increase the number of claimants and so argued
for the inclusion of more tort defenses. Their inclusion, even if all parties
had agreed, would have defeated the objective of a simple, easily understandable trigger. Much litigation would have been required to resolve its
meaning. On the other hand, consumer groups feared that the trigger
would not compensate enough people. In the end, the effort to devise a
different standard for compensation in the alternative claims system was
abandoned.
Supporters of alternative claims systems then tried to devise a system
using economic incentives to produce results that would be similar to
those sought in Senate Amendment No. 16 and S. 1999. The result was
S. 2760, the Product Liability Reform Act.5 5 The basic concept of S. 2760
was that in a court proceeding, either the plaintiff or the defendant could
offer to settle the case for a specific amount-net economic loss for small
cases and net economic loss, plus $100,000 in very serious injury and
death cases 56-and if the other party refused, then the refusing party
could be subject to penalties in the tort suit.5 7 Thus, if a manufacturer
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

See id. at 12 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
These efforts were conducted primarily by a group of consumer, labor and business representatives and Senate staff under the auspices of Sen. Danforth, then Chairman of the Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee. See id. at 12-16.
S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), also known as the Product Liability Voluntary Claims
and Uniform Standards Act.
See Hearing, supra note 30, at 19-20, 38-39.
See id. at 39.
See id. at 20-23.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 22-23 and 27-31.
Actually, the initial result was Senate Amendment No. 1951 to S. 1999, introduced by Sen.
Danforth and Sen. Dodd on May 12, 1986. In certain respects, this Amendment outlined a
more comprehensive alternative claims system than S. 2760. For example, the Amendment
contained detailed provisions for settling claims and provisions insuring that manufacturers
would have enough information to make a rational decision on whether or not to settle. For
the full text of the Product Liability Reform Act, see PROD. SAFEr & LtAn. REP. (BNA) No.
26, at 456-64 (June 27, 1986).
See S. REp. No. 442, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-19 (1986).
Id. at 19-22.
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refused a settlement offer only to have the court award an amount equal
to or greater than the current value of the claimant's offer, the court
would have been required to increase the award by the amount of the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs, up to a maximum of $100,000.58 If,
on the other hand, the claimant rejected a qualifying offer from the
manufacturer and the court then awarded an amount equal to or less
than the manufacturer's offer, there would be caps imposed on the
plaintiff's recovery. 5 9
The bill had some shortcomings: (1) it did not contain a standard
for compensation of innocent victims; (2) all actions had to be initiated
through a court proceeding, which would have increased transaction costs
unnecessarily; (3) the limitations on recoveries through the use of caps,
although fair in the average case, would produce unfair results in some
cases; and (4) the bill did not require injured people to give manufacturers
enough information to make reasoned decisions about whether to make
a settlement offer. Nonetheless, it was the best hope for significant
change in the 99th Congress. 6°
THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILTY LEGISLATION
With no apparent interest in product liability alternative compensation
bills in either the Senate Commerce or the Senate Judiciary Committee,
and with the House Energy and Commerce Committee examining tort
reform bills once again, this is a good time to step back and examine
what needs to be done to create a product liability system that would
better serve all parties to tort litigation.
First, the current federal tort reform bill 61 and the noneconomic
damages cap legislation being considered by the states 62 are not the answer.
Obviously, such bills are not designed to help claimants overcome their
legitimate quarrels with the tort system. It seems equally obvious that the
tort reform proposals being considered would have, at most, a marginally
favorable effect on manufacturers' costs. Once again, if the proponents
of tort reform are correct in their view that the tort system has become
far more expensive because judges and juries side with injured people
with few resources, rather than manufacturers with greater resources and
insurance, then requiring a plaintiff to establish fault in order to recover
will not remove the problems that produced today's difficulties.
58.
59.

60.

61.
62.

Id. at 18-22.
See Product Liability Reform Act § 204. For small injuries, the cap would have been net
economic loss plus two times economic loss up to a maximum of $50,000. For the seriously
injured, those suffering "dignitary loss," the cap would have been net economic loss plus a
maximum of $250,000.
S. 2760 was reported from the Commerce Committee on June 26, 1986, and reached the Senate
floor in September 1986. After several days of debate, however, it was pulled because there
were insufficient votes to cut off a threatened filibuster. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
H.R. 1115, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H708 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1987).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431 (West 1987) (in personal injury, property damage or wrongful death
actions, liability for each defendant is several for non-economic damages).

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 14:133

Joint and several liability provisions may be of some utility, but they,
too, have some problems. First, nothing would prevent a sympathetic jury
from assigning a greater percentage of fault to the "deep pocket" to
compensate for the new law. Second, the joint and several provisions still
would apply to economic losses, with several liability attaching only to
noneconomic losses. Inasmuch as the data show compensation in serious
injury cases rarely approaches full compensation of economic losses, 63 let
alone noneconomic losses, the joint and several liability reform may be
of limited utility to deep pockets. For the same reasons, the various state
laws imposing caps on noneconomic damages are likely to be of little
help to manufacturers and insurers."
If tort reform proposals are unlikely to have a significant effect on
manufacturers' costs and would do nothing to solve the equally serious
problems of injured people, what should be done to reform the product
liability system? We need not look too far for the answer. It lies in the
work that was done in 1985 and 1986.65 There appeared to be general
agreement among the parties, with the exception of the trial bar, that
there should be an alternative claims system and that offers from the
parties could replace development of a different standard for recovery in
the claims system. There also was agreement that an offer of net economic
loss was the appropriate offer in all cases except those involving death
and serious injuries, although there remains disagreement about whether
$100,000 constitutes an appropriate noneconomic damages offer in such
cases .66
The bill failed in the Senate largely because of its use of caps as a
means of encouraging people to settle cases. Although there are different,
and perhaps fairer, ways to set caps, it might be more fruitful to look
for alternative incentives to encourage settlements. If manufacturers are
most afraid of the application of non-fault-based standards, the availability
of a fault-based standard could be used as the incentive to encourage
63.
64.

65.
66.

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
The only proposal that would have had a significant effect was the Reagan Administration's
proposal to cap all noneconomic damages-including those for punitive damages-at $100,000.
When the Senate Commerce Committee marked up the bill that was to become S. 2760, not
even the staunchest supporters of the manufacturers' position were willing to offer the proposal
as an amendment.
See supra notes 30-60 and accompanying text.
The average payment in serious injury cases does not match the level of economic loss and
takes about five years to collect. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Thus, a good
argument can be made that timely payment for economic loss with no payment for noneconomic
loss would represent a better system than the present one. Although there is no magic total cost
figure for any new system, it is politically unlikely to prevail unless the new system is no more
expensive than the old one. Inasmuch as more people would be compensated under an alternative
claims system, and the funds would come from payments beyond economic loss in the present
system and from lower attorneys' fees, what level, if any, of noneconomic damages payment
would be justified in the claims system? It is important to remember that the use of incentives
other than caps to encourage settlement weakens the argument for paying noneconomic damages
in the claims system. An injured person can always choose to sue for full tort damages. The
figures set for compensation in the claims system must be affordable within the overall context
of the new system, and they must not be so high that they discourage manufacturers from
making offers.
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manufacturers to make settlement offers. For example, when a claimant
rejects a settlement offer, the individual should not be allowed to recover
in a tort suit unless he or she could establish that the manufacturer's
negligence caused the injury. The offer would thus foreclose the applicability of absolute or strict liability standards. It might also be worth
considering increasing the standard of proof to "clear and convincing"
and the standard of liability to gross negligence. Should the plaintiff turn
down a fair offer to make him or her economically whole (plus an amount
for noneconomic damages well above the average amount recovered in
serious injury cases), then the plaintiff should truly be required to demonstrate bad conduct by the manufacturer in order to recover full tort
damages.
Imposing any penalty on defendants for failing to accept settlement
offers would be a lesser concern, because manufacturers are afraid of the
tort system. The threat of litigation should be sufficient to get defendants
to pay where it is clearly their fault or the case is close, and any penalty
67
would be superfluous.
In sum, a person injured by a product would have two choices. First,
the person could file a claim against the manufacturer for net economic
loss and, in the case of a serious and permanent injury, net economic
loss plus $100,000 to $250,000. If the manufacturer agreed to pay, then
the manufacturer would be obligated to pay all such losses. The manufacturer would not be permitted to discharge its obligation by offering a
specific amount; the manufacturer would have to agree to pay "net
economic loss."
Alternatively, the injured person could file a suit seeking all tort
damages permissible under state law. Here, the manufacturer could use
information obtained during discovery to decide whether to make an offer
to pay net economic loss. If such an offer were made and refused, the
68
plaintiff would have to meet a fault standard to prevail.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Although a change from caps to a fault-based standard might be the
key to workable and fair legislation, time has shown that no side has the
political power to impose its will on others. Thus, there probably will be
major federal product liability legislation only when manufacturers, insurers, labor and consumers recognize the problems with the present
system and actively seek new legislation.
67.

68.

The premise that judges and juries misapply the fault standard to compensate victims would
not apply in a system where the victim has been offered and has turned down a fair settlement.
To assure that the jury would be aware of the offer, the legislation could require the court to
inform the jury of settlement offers rejected by the injured person.
A number of the other tort changes from S. 2760 probably should be made. These changes
could be part of the residual tort system for all cases or triggered if the manufacturer makes a
conforming offer and the claimant turns it down. Senate Amendment No. 1951 follows an inbetween course. Most of the tort changes are applicable to all lawsuits. Some of the changes,
however, such as those in the joint and several liability, apply only if the manufacturer made
an appropriate offer.
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Manufacturers and insurers are convinced, obviously, that changes
are needed. Although their first choice would be tort reform, they showed
during the 99th Congress that they are prepared to accept
an alternative
69
claims system if changes are made in the tort system.
Consumer and labor representatives, however, are not convinced that
federal legislation is in their best interest. The first concern for many is
whether the tort system really does treat injured people poorly. In the
99th Congress, they often questioned whether the Insurance Services Office
data was still valid in the mid-1980s. 70 Perhaps the recent insurance data
reaffirming the plight of the average victim will heighten concern about
the tort system's ability to compensate people injured by products. 7'
Increases in the cost of particular products and the failure to introduce
technologically feasible but uninsurable products might also sensitize the
consumer community. Labor will have a particular interest if insurance
costs result in lost jobs as products are not produced and if federal
legislation can address the problems of long-latency illnesses more effectively than state worker compensation laws.
If these or other factors eventually convince consumer and labor
representatives they have as much to gain as manufacturers and insurers
from changing the present product liability system, then the next issue
will be what shape the legislation should take. To date, they have opposed
all tort reform bills, and there is no reason to expect that stance to
change, since such bills do not address the problems injured people face
in the tort system.
Consumer and labor representatives have participated in numerous
meetings on proposals to create alternative claims systems. Although they
have been suspicious about such systems, they have not expressed opposition to the concept. If they resolve their doubts about how badly the
tort system treats injured people, then the next key step they will have to
take will be to stop rejecting alternatives because they can identify a few
situations that will not be resolved in the way they think they should be.
Instead, they could look at the aggregate advantages of a new systemin terms of compensation for more innocent injured people, faster compensation, similar compensation for similarly injured people and assured
compensation for those who need it the most, the seriously injured.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, major product liability legislation will be passed
only when all parties stop measuring new proposals against their view of
perfection and instead measure them against the highly imperfect tort
system. If and when that time is reached, the work Sen. Danforth and I

69.
70.
71.

A minority of manufacturers actually supported an alternative claims system as a key improvement to the present system.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
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have done, with some modifications, will provide the framework for a
new product liability system.

